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I. INTRODUCTION
In a January 1991 press release, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.
("Cracker Barrel") announced its new employment policy. William A.
Bridges, Vice President of Human Resources, stated the following:
Cracker Barrel is founded upon a concept of traditional American
values, quality in all we do, and a philosophy of 100% guest satisfac-
tion. It is inconsistent with our concept and values, and is perceived
to be inconsistent with those of our customer base, to continue to
employ individuals in our operating units whose sexual preferences
* J.D. 1998, U.C.LA. School of Law. I would like to thank Professors G. Mitu Gulati, William
B. Rubenstein, and Gillian Lester for their guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank Scott
Abrahamson, Justine Meyers and Susanah Shaw for their helpful comments.
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fail to demonstrate normal heterosexual values which have been the
foundation of families in our society. Therefore, it is felt this
business decision is in the best interests of the company.'
Shortly after this press release, Cracker Barrel fired between eight and eleven
employees because of their sexual orientation.2 In response, protesters
organized sit-ins, boycotts, and picket lines.' In June 1991, demonstrations at
Cracker Barrel restaurants resulted in nearly thirty arrests." Yet, the fired
employees could not bring a lawsuit in either federal or state court because
neither Title VII nor any of the applicable state statutes prohibited discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation.
Because Cracker Barrel's discriminatory employment policy was immune
to conventional civil rights litigation, one of its shareholders, New York City
Employees Retirement Systems ("NYCERS"), found an alternative method to
pressure Cracker Barrel into reconsidering the policy-the shareholder pro-
posal. A shareholder proposal is a recommendation or requirement that the
corporate managers take action; it is submitted to management to be mailed
to all shareholders along with the manager's proxy material.5 Shareholders
I Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 984
(Oct. 13, 1992) at 14 [hereinafter Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter].
2 See, Ruth Ann Leach, Movie Should Shame Cracker Barrel Officials, NASHVILLE BANNER, Jan.
23, 1997, at A7 ("Summerville had been working in the kitchen at Cracker Barrel for 3% years when the
new policy was announced.... Summerville tells how she asked her supervisor to read her the new policy.
She was told not to worry because 'we're really targeting effeminate men.' Summerville replied, 'if it
applies to them, it applies to me.' She was fired that afternoon. Her termination papers state that the only
reason for her dismissal: She 'is gay."').
3 lId See also, Beverly Shepard, A Very Big Shock, ATLANTA CONSTrUTION, Mar. 29, 1992, at
D7 (Cracker Barrel officials would not comment on whether the protests have affected business and Cheryl
Summerville was called the "Rosa Parks of the gay movement"); Va Sit-In for Gay Rights, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 30, 1992, at D5 (gay-rights supporters staged a sit-in at Cracker-Barrel in Spotsylvania, Va.,
to protest the restaurant's firing of homosexual employees); Reed Johnson, Cracker Barrel Reflects 'Bygone
Era', DEMOrr NEWS, Aug. 29, 1991; N.Y. TMES, Feb. 28, 1991 at A22 (gay workers say they were fired
from their jobs as a result of the policy adopted not to employ homosexuals); Cracker Barrel No-Action
Letter, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting August 19, 1992 letter to William E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel
Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance, from Sue Ellen Dodell, Deputy
Counsel on behalf of NYCERS).
4 Michael J. Connell, Shareholder Proposals, 799 PL/Corp 631,664 (1993) (quoting July 30,
1992 letter to William E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission Division of
Corporate Finance, from Paula L Chester, General Counsel to New York City Comptroller Elizabeth
Holtzman).
5 See, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14a-8. In order to be eligible to submit a proposal the shareholder
must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 10%, of the company's securities for at least
one year. In effect, the shareholder proposal rules require the corporation to subsidize the costs of
communication between shareholders. The rules attempt to distinguish proposals that managers are
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or their proxies vote on the proposal at the next shareholders' meeting. Even
when the proposals do not receive a majority vote, they are often effective
because they attract the media attention that influences managers. The
NYCERS proposal asked Cracker Barrel to implement nondiscriminatory
policies and to add explicit prohibitions against discrimination based on
sexual orientation to its employment policy statements.6 Cracker Barrel
attempted to exclude this shareholder proposal from its proxy material and
petitioned the Securities Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to evaluate the
legality of excluding the proposal. The SEC approved Cracker Barrel's
exclusion on the basis that the shareholder proposal involved "day-to-day"
business and, thus, fell under the "ordinary business" exception.7 This SEC
interpretation of the shareholder proposal rule, known as the "Cracker Barrel
position," later became the subject of a celebrated legal dispute. In NYCERS,
et al., v. SEC," the Second Circuit upheld the SEC's Cracker Barrel position
and found that the no-action letter was not subject to notice and comment
requirements because it was "interpretive," rather than legislative. Further-
more, the court held that it would not apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review when the shareholders had an alternative private action
against the corporation.
As a result of the SEC's Cracker Barrel position, managers were
automatically able to exclude virtually all employment related shareholder
proposals from their proxy material. However, on May 20, 1998, the SEC
reversed itself, abandoned the Cracker Barrel bright-line rule, and returned to
a case-by-case analysis of employment related shareholder proposals.9
Shareholder activists claimed the reversal of the Cracker Barrel position as a
required to include in proxy material from proposals that managers may decline to distribute. For a full
explanation of shareholder proposals see Part Ill.
6 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note I (quoting August 19, 1992 letter to William E.
Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance, from
Sue Ellen Dodell, Deputy Counsel on behalf of NYCERS).
7 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 4. Proposals relating to day-to-day business
are generally excludable under the ordinary business exception. Before the SEC Cracker Barrel position,
the SEC had the discretion to determine which employment related proposals could be excluded. Under
the Cracker Barrel position, the SEC did not use discretion, but instead allowed the automatic exclusion
of any employment related proposal. This included employment related proposals that addressed the policy
of a corporation or affected a social policy issue. For a full explanation of the ordinary business exception
see Part 1l of this Article.
a 45 F. 3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
9 See, Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. 240, Release No.
34-40018, File No. S7-25-97, May 21,1998, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001; 'Cracker Barrel' Policy Overturned
by SEC, NAT'L LJ., June I, 1998 B2.
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victory."0 Upon closer inspection, however, this seeming victory is of limited
value.
Despite its apparent protection of discrimination related shareholder
proposals, the reversal of the Cracker Barrel position returns discretion to the
SEC, causing uncertainty for both shareholders and managers. By returning
to SEC discretion without addressing its own history of vacillation, the SEC
has merely replaced an unpopular rule with an ambiguous one. Moreover, the
SEC's reversal does nothing to ensure discussion in the corporate forum about
discrimination issues. In part, it is because these discrimination issues are not
addressed in other forums that shareholders must be given the opportunity to
raise them in the corporate forum. Finally, the mere reversal of the Cracker
Barrel position places undue value on external control, as opposed to internal
policy reform. As a result, the SEC will be overburdened, corporations will
be discouraged from reforming themselves, and what appears to be a short
term gain may turn out to be a long term loss. Rather than reversing its
Cracker Barrel position, the SEC should clarify its policy by creating a
presumption in favor of the inclusion of discrimination related shareholder
proposals.
Part II of this article describes the problem of unaddressed discrimination
by focusing on discrimination against lesbians and gay men, and more subtle
forms of discrimination based on gender and race. Part II also demonstrates
how the shareholder proposal can be used to confront this unaddressed
discrimination. Part I provides background on proxy solicitations and
shareholder proposals. It also explains the package of reforms that the SEC
recently rejected. Part IV analyzes the reversal of the Cracker Barrel position
in light of numerous policy questions about SEC discretion, appropriateness
of corporate forums, and sources of control. It considers how the SEC and
various courts have interpreted the shareholder proposal rule and tracks the
SEC's history of vacillating and inconsistent no-action letters.1 ' The
conclusion briefly suggests alternatives to the SEC rule that would more
adequately protect discrimination related proposals and create clarity for both
shareholders and managers.
30 Vote Favors Social Proposals, NEWSDAY, May 21, 1998 at A70; Mary Gordon, SEC Broadens
Shareholder's Voice, Associated Press, May 20, 1998.
1 After a shareholder proposal is submitted, the management may write to the SEC requesting a
statement that the SEC will take 'no-action' if the management excludes the proposal from its proxy
material. The SEC statement is the 'no-action letter.' For a full explanation of no-action letters see Part
Hi.
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II. THE PROBLEM: UNADDRESSED DISCRIMINATION
A. The Cracker Barrel Story: Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation
Based in Lebanon, Tennessee, Cracker Barrel is a moderately priced
restaurant and gift shop chain." The gift shops sell Americana such as
porcelain figures, Coca-Cola paraphernalia, and fluted glassware. 3 The
restaurants' menus stress old-fashioned American cooking including
hamburgers, catfish, country-fried steak, Smores, and Coca Cola Cake. 4 In
1997, Cracker Barrel's fiscal first-quarter profits rose 26% to $23.7 million. 5
For the fiscal year that ended August 1, 1997, Cracker Barrel reported sales
of $1.124 billion.1 6 In 1992, Cracker Barrel had over 14,000 employees across
the country.
17
In 1991, NYCERS was New York City's largest employee pension fund
with assets of $19 billion. In 1992, NYCERS had 81,104 of Cracker Barrel
common stock, which it had owned for over a year.'9 NYCERS asserted that
soon after the Cracker Barrel press release at least eleven Cracker Barrel
employees were fired solely because they were lesbians or gay men." Cracker
Barrel disagreed only about the number of employees fired, stating that eight
gay employees were terminated in January of 1991 and that in February a
12 Jody Rathgeb, Cracker Barrel Offers Fare That's Hearty, Simple, RICHMOND TIME-DISPATCH,
Dec. 25, 1997, at D14.
13 Id. at D14.
14 Michael Muckian, Cracker Barrel Satisfying, Overall, CAPITAL TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at 4D.
Is Business Brief: Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1997, at B6.
16 Jack Hayes, After Free Fall Cracker Barrel Rolls as a Top Contender in Family Segment,
NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Nov. 17, 1997, at 1.
17 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note I, at II (quoting August 11, 1992 letter to William
E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance, from
Robert G. McCullough, representative of Cracker Barrel).
is Cracker Barrel's Policy on Gays Faces Action By New York Fund, WA.L ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991.
19 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 43 (Attachment 2) (quoting June 12, 1992
letter to Dan Evins, President Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, from Elizabeth Holtzman, custodian of
NYCERS, and June 8, 1992 letter from Citibank, N.A.).
20 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting July 30, 1992 letter to William
E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance, from
Paula L Chester, General Counsel to New York City Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman). Footnote 2 of the
letter referred to "Separation Notices" and "Disciplinary & Termination Reports" as examples of
termination notices received by lesbian and gay workers in January and February of 1991. According to
the letter, the notices and reports stated that the employees were terminated because they violated Cracker
Barrel's policy against employing homosexuals.
1999]
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ninth employee was terminated when she confronted her store manager with
the fact that she was a lesbian." Cracker Barrel later claimed that it had
publicly apologized for these incidents and did not fire any other employees
based on sexual orientation.22 However, Cracker Barrel did not rescind the
policy, reinstate dismissed workers, or offer them compensation for wrongful
discharge.23
NYCERS responded to the firings with a shareholder proposal requesting
that Cracker Barrel change its policy of discrimination.24 In light of the fact
that more conventional litigation strategies were unavailable, the shareholder
proposal seemed to provide the best method to bring the discrimination to the
attention of a larger audience.2" While the proposal did not guarantee that
particular employees would be reinstated or recover damages, it exposed the
discrimination, created dialogue between shareholders and managers, and
raised the issue for public debate. Furthermore, the shareholder proposal drew
the attention of the media and, thus, had the potential to influence managers.26
In a no-action letter to Cracker Barrel, the SEC stated that Cracker Barrel
was not required to include the employment discrimination shareholder
proposal in its proxy material to be sent out to all shareholders." In this letter,
the SEC changed its position from one that allowed some employment related
proposals to a position that automatically excluded all employment related
proposals. In other words, the Cracker Barrel position meant that all employ-
ment related proposals fell under the ordinary business exception.2" Although
the position was controversial, it did have one significant benefit; it was a
21 Ruth Ann Leach, supra note 2; Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting
August 11, 1992 letter to William E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporate Finance, from Robert G. McCullough, legal representative of Cracker Barrel).
2 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that in 1993 Cracker Barrel
declared that it was an equal opportunity employer that adheres to the letter and the spirit of the law
regarding equal treatment in the workplace). See also, 14% of Cracker Barrel Investors Back First
Shareholders Resolution for Gay Rights, LA. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993 at D3.
23 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting July 30, 1992 letter to William
E. Morley, Esq., Chief Counsel Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance, from
Paula L Chester, General Counsel to New York City Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman).
2 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at I I (quoting original letter from NYCERS to
the SEC).
23 By 'conventional litigation strategies' I mean litigation based on Title VII or a state statute.
2 Cracker Barrel's Policy on Gays Faces Action By New York Fund, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1991.
27 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note I (allowing exclusion of proposal that the
corporation implement no disciminatory employment policies related to sexual orientation because day-to-
day issues concerning hiring and other personnel matters are properly left to the company management).
n Ordinary business is not considered to be under the authority of shareholders and, thus,
proposals regarding ordinary business can be excluded. For a complete discussion of the ordinary business
exception see Part M.
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bright-line rule that put an end to the history of SEC discretion and vacillation.
However, the Cracker Barrel position created certainty at the price of
shareholder suffrage, anti-discrimination principles, and lesbian and gay men.
The SEC's recent reversal of the Cracker Barrel position means that
shareholder proposals which raise employment policy issues will no longer be
automatically labeled ordinary business and, thus, barred from a shareholder
vote. A coalition of 340 activist, religious and labor groups "declared victory"
after the agency voted to adopt the revised rules.29 The shareholder proposal
is an important tool to address discrimination based on sexual orientation
because there are so few avenues to confront this type of discrimination. Title
VII and many state statutes do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation, and even in jurisdictions where individuals can bring a state law
claim, juries are not always receptive to claims based on sexual orientation.
Thus, the shareholder proposal and accompanying media attention present an
alternative strategy in the face of pervasive prejudice against lesbians and gay
men.' However, the reversal of the Cracker Barrel position returns sharehold-
ers and managers to the uncertainty of the pre-Cracker Barrel position and
does nothing to ensure that proposals addressing sexual orientation will be
included in the future.
B. Subtle Discrimination
The problem of unaddressed employment discrimination is not confined
to discrimination against lesbians and gay men. Empirical research demon-
strates that when whites evaluate blacks, they frequently attribute negative
acts "to personal disposition, while positive acts are discounted as the product
of luck or special circumstances."'" This type of subtle discrimination based
29 Mary Gordon, SEC Broadens Shareholder's Voice, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 1998. The
coalition included the Social Investment Forum, the AFL-CIO, the Episcopal Church, several Catholic,
Jewish and Baptist groups, the National Organization for Women, civil rights groups, environmentalist's
organizations, children's advocates, the YWCA, and several corporations and financial firms such as the
Burrito Brothers and the U.S. Trust Co. of Boston, Inc.
30 Raymond J. Babin, Letters to the Editor: Fighting for Our Lives and Livelihoods, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 16, 1995, at AIS. Lesbians and gay men experience overt discrimination (examples include the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy of the armed services, and the custody battle where Sharon Bottom was denied
custody of her child based on her homosexuality) and violence (examples include death threats against the
owners of Camp Sister Spirit and the murder of Matthew Shepard). Less-overt discrimination occurs in
the form of denials of job promotions, salary increases, medical care, credit, and housing.
31 Michael Semi, Testingfor Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1251. 1283-85 (1995) ("When the discrimination is subtle or unconscious, even a non-
discriminating employer may not be able to identity and corect the resulting inefficiencies ... Stereotypes
stem from the inability of individuals to internalize the social norms to which they openly ascribe so that
while individuals proclaim they are not prejudiced their actions often indicate otherwise."). See also, James
2791999]
280 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:273
on race or gender often goes unaddressed. 2 Furthermore, it is not clear that
corporations maintaining employment policies that disadvantage African-
American workers will necessarily be driven from the market.33 Moreover,
Title VII remedies are not appropriate in all cases of subtle discrimination34
and statutes like Title VII are difficult to apply to many jobs because
judgments about the best candidate are inherently subjective. 3' Finally,
institutional practices are not likely to be denounced under disparate impact
analysis because changing these practices would involve fundamental
restructuring of the way corporate firms do business.36
Thus, non-conventional civil rights strategies may be more a more realistic
means of addressing subtle discrimination where managers or juries are
skeptical that discrimination exists. Similarly, promoting internal change
within a corporation is probably a more effective method of curbing subtle
forms of race and gender discrimination, as well as discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Shareholder proposals provide an alternative strategy to
foster internal change and address these subtle forms of discrimination.
C. A Potential Strategy
Both the Cracker Barrel policy of discrimination and the prevalence of
more subtle forms of discrimination demonstrate a need to curb otherwise
unaddressed discrimination. In the past, shareholder proposals have been
Jones, Piercing the Veil: Bi-cultural Strategies for Coping with Prejudice and Racism in OPENING DOORS:
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, 179, 195 (Harry J. Knopke et al. eds.,
199 1) ("the basic tendency for human beings [is] to make social categorical judgments leading to an in
group preference").
32 For example, state and federal statutes do not require corporations to adopt affirmative action
programs that would address this kind of subtle discrimination. See also, Barbara R. Bergmann, The
Corporation Faces Issues of Race and Gender, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 269, 271-84 (Carl
Kaysen ed., 1996) (including statistical evidence of continued work place discrimination against minorities
and women).
33 David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L REv. 493, 557 (1996) (rejecting the traditional economic
assumption that firms that maintain employment policies that disadvantage black workers will necessarily
be driven from the market).
34 Id. at 585 (citing Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White
Subjective Decision Making, 104 YALE LJ. 2009 (1995); S. Elizabeth Foster, Comment, The Glass Ceiling
in the Legal Profession: Why Do Law Firms Have So Few Female Partners, 42 UCLA L REV. 1631, 1668
(1995)).
3 Wilkins and Gulati, supra note 33, at 586 ("At the hiring stage, the inherently subjective and
provisional character of judgments about the quality of a given candidate would make it difficult for firms
to develop a set of objective criteria capable of credibly determining which candidates are in fact better
qualified.").
36 Id. at 586.
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effective in addressing discrimination. However, the effectiveness is usually
indirect. In most cases, a shareholder proposal does not receive a majority of
the vote and even when it does, the corporation is often not required to adopt
the proposal.37 In most states, even when a majority of the shareholders vote
for a proposal, the proposal can only serve to advise the management." Thus,
shareholder proposals often have no direct effect on the decisions of
managers.
However, the indirect effects of shareholder proposals can be significant.
Even when formal changes are not made, symbolic messages have conse-
quences.39 Furthermore, a proposal influences management even if it fails to
receive a majority vote.' ° Unlike a public election, anything less than a near-
unanimous vote of confidence sends a message and may generate enough bad
press and uneasy feelings to elicit action.4 For example, in 1970, "Campaign
GM" submitted nine proposals, which addressed policies on mass transporta-
tion, air pollution, auto safety, and minority employment, for inclusion in the
managers' proxy materials.42 Seven of the proposals were deemed excludable
by the SEC43 and the two shareholder proposals that were included received
less than 3% of the shareholder votes." However, the sponsors claimed
success because the campaign focused public attention on issues of corporate
responsibility and pressured General Motors's managers to make various
changes including the appointment of an African-American to the board of
37 Robert N. Leavell, Corporate Social-Reform, The Business Judgment Rule and Other
Considerations, 20 GA. L REV. 565 (1986) (discussing whether shareholder proposals should be advisory
or mandatory).
38 Id. While federal law determines which proposals must be included in management's proxy
solicitations, state law determines the effect of the shareholder proposal.
39 Joseph A. Grunfest Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside
the Gates, 45 STAN. L REv. 857, 866 (1993) (arguing that 'just vote no" campaigns do not oust incumbent
directors but that they do have significant consequences); Ricki Fulman, Shareholder Activism: Pension
Funds Led Corporate Governance Revolution: Not Just for Gadflys Anymore, Investor Activism Gets
Results, Feb. 9, 1998, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS (for a brief history of effective proposals regarding
financial performance and board accountability).
40 John C. Wilcox, Making the Best of Shareholder Resolutions, 922 PU/Corp 201, 203-205
(1995). Bob Monks, a proponent of shareholder activism through his LENS Fund, regards the proposal
process and an "invaluable" tool for shareholders and states that 'it almost doesn't matter what the subject
of the proposal is." because the process has become so effective in attracting the attention of corporate
executives and mobilizing shareholder support. Id.
41 Richard H. Koppes, Institutional Investors, Now in Control of More than Half the Shares of US
Corporations, Demand More Accountability, NAT'L LJ., April 14, 1997, at B5.
42 Leavell, supra note 37, at 583.
43 Id. at 583.
44 Wilcox, supra note 40, at 344 (citing Schwartz, Proxy Power & Social Goals: How Campaign
GM Succeeded, 45 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 764 (1971)).
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directors.45 The success of the shareholder proposal depends on the goals of
the proponents. A successful shareholder proposal may not be defined as a
proposal receiving a majority vote, but rather as one that fosters a media
campaign that has a practical effect on management decision making.
The shareholder proposals that influenced corporate behavior in South
Africa also exemplify the potential effectiveness of proposals.46 Many
American corporations signed an agreement to honor the Sullivan principles,
designed to promote equality in South Africa, in part, because of the influence
of shareholder proposals.47 The greatest amount of shareholder support was
at Tinoca, Inc. where only 24.4% of the shareholder voting authority was in
favor of the Sullivan Principles.' While these shareholder proposals won far
less than a majority of the votes, they publicized the discriminatory policies
of apartheid and indirectly influenced managers to take action.49
Proposals by institutional shareholders are especially likely to command
the attention of managers" and are often used to increase bargaining power
when negotiating with managers."' Even if it is not put to a vote, a proposal
may prompt management to make concessions in return for the withdrawal of
a proposal.5 2 Some commentators concede that these institutional proposals
can be effective, but insist that they are inefficient; rather than attempting to
alter management's behavior, institutional shareholders should abide by the
"Wall Street Rule."53 The Wall Street Rule requires shareholders to express
their discontent by selling their stock when they are dissatisfied. However,
45 Id. at 344.
4 Virginia J. Hamisch, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does it Protect Social Responsibility
Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L & POL. 415, 441 (1990).
47 ld. at 441; Elizabeth Glass Geltman and Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the
Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L 465 (1997).
4 Hamisch supra note 46, at 441 (citing Shareholder Proposals On Governance, Social
Responsibility Gain Support, Study Indicates, Daily Report on Executives (BNA) No. 122, at A-4 (June
26, 1987)).
49 Id. at 441.
30 Robert N. Leavell, supra note 37.
S Geltman and Skroback, supra note 47, at 469 n.31 (stating that the shareholders will meet with
management, reach a compromise, and the proposal is withdrawn from the proxy process); Stewart J.
Schwab and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor
Unions, 96 MICH. L REV. 1018, 1023 (1998) (distinguishing union-shareholder initiatives designed to
further union's traditional organizing and collective bargaining goals from those that enhance union's role
in corporate decision-making).
52 Proposed Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 CFR Part 240, at 35 Release No. 34-39093, File No. S7-25-97, [hereinafter Proposed
Rule].
33 Susan W. Ilebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L REv. 425,
447 (1984).
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this argument for selling stock does not incorporate the shareholders'
preference for pressuring managers to address the particular source of their
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, large investment funds often have so much stock
in a corporation that they can only sell their shares to a limited number of
other institutions.'" Finally, many institutions use "indexing" so that their
portfolios are shaped to match an index such as the S&P 500.55 Once a fund
is indexed, there is little opportunity or desire to change positions in the
indexed portion of the portfolio.' In these situations, the shareholder proposal
is both an effective and efficient way to communicate with management and
confront otherwise unaddressed discrimination.
Ill. BACKGROUND: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE REJECTED
PACKAGE OF REFORMS
A. Shareholder Proposals Defined
Corporations hold annual shareholder meetings in order to elect directors
and vote on a variety of issues including: mergers, liquidations, sales of
substantial assets, and amendments to the articles of incorporation.57 Few
shareholders actually attend these meetings, in part, because most sharehold-
ers do not own enough stock to affect the outcome.58 Because few sharehold-
ers attend, shareholders may appoint an agent to attend the meeting and vote
on their behalf. The agent is the shareholder's "proxy" and the document by
which the shareholder appoints the agent is also called the "proxy."59 Because
the outcome of the meeting depends on the number of votes cast, the agent
with the most proxies wins. The managers of the corporation solicit proxies
from the shareholders directly.6 If the shareholder signs and returns the
managers' proxy card, then the shareholder authorizes the managers to vote
on his or her behalf.
6'
54 Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, 970 PLCorp 371,
374 (1997).
33 Id. at 374.
56 Id. at 374.
57 See generally, WMLiAM A. KEIN & J. MARM RAMsEYER, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 484-526 (1997).
S8 Id. at 484.
5' Id.
60 Id.
6" Id. at 485.
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Congress delegated the task of regulating proxy solicitations to the SEC.62
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 renders unlawful the solicitation of
proxies in violation of the SEC's rules; these rules are now codified at 17
C.F.R. Section 240.14a ("Rule 14a"). They seek "to prevent management or
others from obtaining authorization of corporate action by means of deceptive
or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."63 The SEC interprets Rule
14a-9 to require management to provide shareholders with the opportunity to
submit proposals to management for inclusion in management's proxy
material.' This interpretation is intended to ensure that the contents of the
proxy statement accurately reflect all the issues that will arise at the annual
meeting.6" Corporations are required to inform shareholders of these
proposals so that shareholders can take into account the proposals that will be
voted on when they choose who will be their proxy.66
Between 300 and 400 companies typically receive a total of about 900
shareholder proposals each year.67 A majority of the proposals focus on
corporate governance and compensation matters.68 However, a significant
number of proposals also address social policy issues.69 There is a history of
shareholder proposals regarding issues such as divestment from South Africa,
adoption of the MacBride principles (addressing discrimination in Northern
Ireland), withdrawal from the production of napalm, disclosure of environ-
mental information, and policies regarding affirmative action and employment
discrimination. °
62 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 877,
881 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In contrast, shareholder proposals that are presented by a shareholder in attendance
at the annual meeting are regulated by state law.
63 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 881 (citing J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431, (1964)); 1934
Securities Exchange Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 52.
Id. at 882.
Id
k% New York City Employee's Retirement System v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F.Supp. 1382,
1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Since a shareholder may present a proposal at the annual meeting regardless of
whether the proposal is included in a proxy solicitation, the corporate circulation of proxy materials which
fail to make reference to a shareholder's intention to present a proper proposal at the annual meeting renders
the solicitation inherently misleading.").
67 Proposed Rule, supra note 52.
69 Id.
6 Proposed Rule, supra note 52. 'Social policy' proposals address a wide variety of topics such
as: the environment, the manufacture of tobacco products, divestment from South Africa, employment
discrimination, child labor, etc.
o Geitman and Skroback, supra note 47 (tracing the history of shareholder proposals); Kevin W.
Waite, Note: The Ordinary Business Operations Exception to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return
to Predictability, 64 FORDAM L REV. 1253 (1995); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in
American Corporate Finance 85 CAL L REV. 1 (1997).
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Without management's subsidy of shareholder proposals through the
distribution of proxy materials, reform initiatives would be rare.7 If a proposal
is unsuccessful, state law provides no mechanism for reimbursement from the
corporation.' Even if a proposal is successful in raising the value of the stock,
the proponent would only gain in proportion to his or her share holdings.73
Other shareholders would benefit from the proposal without having to cont-
ribute to the costs of the proposal. Without Rule 14a-8, requiring management
to bear the cost of distribution, the financial disincentives to shareholder
proposals would be great. The subsidized distribution alleviates the collective
action and free-rider problems that shareholders must overcome.74
Rule 14a-8(c)(7) generally requires management to include shareholder
proposals. However, an exception to the rule permits management to omit a
shareholder proposal if "the proposal deals with a matter relating to the
conduct of the ordinary business operations. ' 75 The policy underlying the
ordinary business exception is to confine the resolution of everyday problems
to the managers since it is impractical for shareholders to decide how to solve
such problems.76 The ordinary business exception excludes proposals that
shareholders, as a group, would not be qualified to judge due to a lack of
business expertise and intimate knowledge of the company. 77 A shareholder
proposal about ordinary business operations would also be improper if raised
at an annual meeting because most states, including Delaware, maintain that
ordinary business operations are under the authority of the directors and not
the shareholders. 78 Thus, when the SEC applies the ordinary business
exception, it does so to save management the cost of including a proposal that
would be improper if raised by a shareholder at the annual meeting.79
Managers who wish to omit shareholder proposals from their proxy
statement must file with the SEC and may request that the SEC issue a "no-
action" letter.8" In a no-action letter the SEC staff informs the company
whether or not the SEC will "act" if management omits the proposal.8
71 Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation,
45 ALA. L REV. 879, 895 (1994).
72 Id. at 896.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 895.
75 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14a-8.
76 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 12; Financial Services Alert, BUSINESS MONITOR, June 30,
1998.
77 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 12 (citing Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976)).
78 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 883.
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Management must demonstrate that it would be improper to include a
particular shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, 2 These no-action
letters have historically been inconsistent and confusing. The SEC issued the
1976 Interpretive Release to try to clarify its position on the ordinary business
exception:
The term "ordinary business operations" has been deemed on
occasion to include certain matters which have significant policy,
economic or other implications inherent in them. For instance, a
proposal that a utility company not construct a proposed nuclear
power plant has in the past been considered excludable. In retrospect,
however, it seems apparent that the economic and safety consider-
ations attendant to nuclear power plants are of such magnitude that a
determination whether to construct one is not an "ordinary" business
matter. Accordingly, proposals of that nature as well as others having
major implications [will] be considered beyond the realm of an
issuer's ordinary business operations, and future interpretive letters
of the Commission's staff will reflect that view .... Thus, where
proposals involve business matters that are mundane in nature and do
not involve any substantial policy or other considerations, the
subparagraph may be relied upon to omit them.
3
Despite this attempt to clarify, the SEC's application of the ordinary business
exception has continued to vacillate. 4
B. Employment Policy Proposals: The Wal-Mart and Cracker Barrel
Controversies
Since 1983, the SEC has determined whether employment policy
proposals may be excluded under the ordinary business exception by asking
if the proposal relates to day-to-day employment matters rather than
significant policy considerations.8 5 Day-to-day employment matters that may
be omitted from management's proxy material include: employee health
benefits, general compensation issues not focused on senior executives,
82 Id (citing Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4979,
1954 SEC LEXIS 38 *3 (Jan. 6, 1954)).
93 Id. (citing Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52 (Dec. 3, 1976)).
94 ld. at 886.
85 Id.
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management of the work place, employee supervision, labor-management
relations, employee hiring and firing, conditions of employment, and
employee training. 6 Before 1992, the SEC found that proposals regarding
equal employment and affirmative action raised policy concerns above and
beyond day-to-day employment matters." Thus, these types of proposals could
not be excluded under the ordinary business exception."
Yet, in 1992, the SEC reversed this position, stating that Cracker Barrel
could omit the shareholder proposal that asked the corporation to discontinue
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 9 In the 1992 no-action letter to
Cracker Barrel, the SEC wrote the following:
86 Id. at 887 (citing United Technologies Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
288 (Feb. 19, 1993)); Proposed Rule, supra note 52 (stating that in 1997 the SEC received approximately
30 submissions implicating the Cracker Barrel position on employment-related proposals).
87 American Telephone and Telegraph Company, SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1716 (Dec. 21, 1988) (stating that the non-discrimination and affirmative action shareholder proposal
involved policy issues and, thus, could not be omitted from AT&T's proxy material under the ordinary
business exception); Dayton Hudson Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act. LEXIS 428 (March
8, 1991) (stating that the shareholder proposals requesting progress reports on the areas of equal
employment opportunity and affirmative action could not be excluded under the ordinary business
exception).
a Id. Although the ordinary business exception may not apply, the SEC rules contain other
potential exceptions. For example, proposals can be omitted if the proposal is based on a personal
grievance, the proposal is not relevant to the business of the corporation, or the proposal is beyond the
power of the corporation to effectuate. 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14.
9 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at *43. The fact that the SEC conclusively
changed its policy in a situation that involved discrimination against lesbians and gay men should not be
ignored. Some may argue that the SEC changed its position because this shareholder proposal dealt with
lesbians and gay men. Lesbians and gay men have little formal protection and one could assert that it is
not coincidental that the SEC viewed this as an appropriate time to shift its policy. Yet, to counter this
suggestion it is relevant to note that in 1991 (a year before the Cracker Barrel no-action letter) the
commission hinted at the shift in policy in a no-action letter that had nothing to do with lesbians and gay
men. The SEC no-action letter issued to Capital Cities/ABC found that the affirmative action proposal
could be excluded from the management's proxy material. More specifically, it stated that the shareholder
proposal was excludable because it requested detailed information on the composition of the company's
work force, employment practices and policies. Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 888 (citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 572 (Apr. 10, 1991)). This statement seemed to imply
that a shareholder proposal was excludable if it related to 'employment practices and policies.' The Capital
Cites/ABC proposal also requested a summary of timetables to implement affirmative action programs.
Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 887. Thus, it is unclear if the SEC indented to shift its position in the Capital
Cities no-action letter so that any employment related proposal was now excludable or if the SEC meant
to merely make proposals requesting timetables excludable. In any case, the Capital Cities decision was
vacated, at the request of the parties, in order to facilitate settlement. Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 888
(citations omitted). While the Capital Cities/ABC no-action letter was not conclusive, it did hint at the
upcoming Cracker Barrel position. Thus, it counters the assertion that the SEC changed its position
because the Cracker Barrel proposal addressed sexual orientation.
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Notwithstanding the general view that employment matters concern-
ing the workforce of the company are excludable as matters involving
the conduct of day-to-day business, exceptions have been made in
some cases where a proponent based an employment-related proposal
on "social policy" concerns. In recent years, however, the line
between includable and excludable employment-related proposals
based on social policy considerations has become increasingly
difficult to draw. The distinctions recognized by the staff are
characterized by many as tenuous, without substance and effectively
nullifying the application of the ordinary business exclusion to
employment-related proposals.
The Division has reconsidered the application of Rule 14a-8(c)(7) to
employment-related proposals in light of these concerns and the
staff's experience with these proposals in recent years. As a result,
the Division has determined that the fact that a shareholder proposal
concerning a company's employment policies and practices for the
general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer be viewed as
removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business opera-
tions of the registrant.9°
With this statement, the SEC changed its position; employment related
proposals focusing on significant social policy issues could automatically be
excluded under the ordinary business exception.9 In response to this change
in position, NYCERS sued the SEC and argued that the court should not defer
to the SEC's Cracker Barrel position. Generally, when a court reviews an
administrative regulation such as the SEC's rules, the court must look to the
agency's interpretation, which is controlling unless that interpretation is
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations."' Although the court
need not defer to an individual no-action letter, courts have historically relied
on the consistency or lack of consistency of the SEC's position in determining
whether a proposal deemed excludable by the SEC staff should really be
90 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1, at *2-*3 (emphasis added).
91 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 12.
92 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 883 (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945)).
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omitted. 93 In NYCERS v. SEC,94 the Second Circuit deferred to the SEC's
Cracker Barrel position that allowed all employment related proposals to be
excluded under the ordinary business exception.
In striking contrast to the NYCERS v. SEC decision, the district court in
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,"
did not defer to the SEC. Instead the Wal-Mart court held that the employ-
ment practices of Wal-Mart involved significant policy issues (rather than
ordinary business) and, thus, required Wal-Mart's management to include the
shareholder's proposal in its proxy solicitation." This holding makes a
significant statement about who holds control over employment discrimination
policies in a corporation. The Wal-Mart court *interpreted the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and held that policies regarding equal employment opportuni-
ties and affirmative action were subject to a shareholder vote. 9
In Wal-Mart, the district court did not defer to the SEC's Cracker Barrel
position primarily because the SEC failed to apply both parts of the 1976
93 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 885 (declining to defer to the SEC and relying on cases which find
that an agency interpretation that conflicts with earlier interpretations or shifts rationale is entitled to
considerably less deference than a consistently held agency position) (citations omitted).
" 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
821 F.Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (affirmed by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995)).
% 1993 Wal-Mart Shareholder Proposal, reprinted in Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 880. The proposal
requested that Wal-Mart's board of directors prepare reports addressing the following:
1) A chart identifying employees according to their sex and race in each of the nine major
EEOC defined job categories for 1990, 1991, and 1992 listing either numbers or percentages
in each category.
2) A summary description of affirmative action programs to improve performance especially in
job categories where women and minorities are under utilized and a description of major
problems in meeting the company's goals and objectives in this area.
3) A description of steps taken to increase the number of managers who are qualified females
and ethnic minorities.
4) A description of ways in which Wal-Mart publicizes our company's policies to merchandise
suppliers and service providers to encourage forward action on their part as well.
5) A description of Wal-Mart's efforts to purchase goods and services from minority and female
owned business enterprises....
The proposal also stated:
We believe the vast majority of Wal-Mart's customers are either women or members of a racial
minority group.
We believe it makes good business sense for Wal-Mart to describe and publicize its employment
standards which relate to its core customer groups and potential employees. By publicizing its
standards, Wal-Mart will be an example to companies with whom it does business.
The Wal-Mart district court held that the proposal could not be omitted as long as requests for information
regarding day-to-day business affairs were deleted from the proposal.
97 The 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 52. The Act asserts that shareholders have a
voice in significant policy decisions made by a corporation.
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Interpretive Release previously discussed." The release states that a proposal
relating to day-to-day business affairs is only excludable if it also does not
raise any substantial policy considerations." However, the Cracker Barrel
position created a bright-line rule that all employment related proposals were
excludable under the ordinary business exception because they related to day-
to-day business affairs, regardless of whether the proposal also involved a
substantial policy consideration."° Thus, the Cracker Barrel position flatly
disregarded the requirement that the proposal must be free of substantial
policy considerations in order to be omitted.'0 ' The Wal-Mart district court
refused to defer to the SEC's Cracker Barrel position because it contradicted
the 1976 Interpretive Release. 2
The shareholder proposal in Wal-Mart sought to identify corporate policy
regarding equal employment and to promote such policies among suppliers.'0 3
The proposal also requested information about every "step" Wal-Mart
management tookto increase the number of female and minority managers,
and asked the corporation to state the "ways" Wal-Mart publicized its equal
employment opportunity and affirmative action policies." The Wal-Mart
district court found that a request for the corporation to state the "ways" Wal-
Mart publicized was excludable because it involved the mundane matters of
Wal-Mart's day-to-day business.0 Thus, the court held that the proposal had
to be included in management's proxy material, provided the shareholders
agreed to delete the parts of the proposal that involved these mundane
matters1 °6
n Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 889.




103 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. 877 (affirmed by Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 54 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995)). Very few courts have reviewed exclusions of
employment related proposals under the ordinary business exception. See generally, New York City
Employees Retirement Systems v. American Brands, 634 F.Supp. 1382 (D.C.N.Y. 1986) (requiring the
corporation to include the shareholder proposal requesting adoption of the MacBride Principles, which set
equal employment guidelines in Northern Ireland, because otherwise shareholders would be irreparably
harmed).
"04 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 891.
105 Id. at 891.
106 Id. at 892; Klein, supra note 57, at 517 (stating that about 90% of the votes cast in the Wal-Mart
meeting were opposed to the proposal considered in the above case); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 54 F.3d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring Wal-Mart to pay
plaintiff's attorney fees of $54,140.00).
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C. The Rejected Package of Reforms
Before the recent reversal of the Cracker Barrel position, the SEC
proposed a package of reforms. The package of reforms included reversal of
the Cracker Barrel position, a 3% override provision, an increase in the
resubmittance threshold, a change in the relevancy exclusion, and a modifica-
tion of the personal grievance exclusion.
The proposed package created so much debate that the SEC extended its
public comment period." 7 While many were pleased with the proposed
reversal of the Cracker Barrel position,0 ' others argued that the package of
reforms would curtail access to the shareholder proposal process."° A
coalition of shareholder activists, including the California Public Employee's
Retirement System, representing more than $1 trillion in pension assets,
argued that if the proposed rule changes had been instituted previously,
shareholder advocacy campaigns addressing apartheid in South Africa and the
sale of tobacco to American youths would have been virtually impossible."'
Jesse Jackson, president of Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, called the proposed
reforms "a grand insult to the intelligence of people who are shareholders.""'
107 Steve Bailey and Steven Syre, Silencing the Shareholders, SEC Reform Proposals End Up
Reining in Resolutions Too Much, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 1997, at A42.
109 SEC home page: www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72597/any25972.txt [hereinafter Individuals'
E-mail]. Individuals e-mailed Chairman Arthur Levitt at the SEC to express their support of the proposed
rule change. The letters were posted on the SEC home page: "I am writing to urge your continued support
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's proposal for change in the rles governing shareholders'
rights regarding company policy-particularly as it impacts job discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.... You have collaborated in baring eligible-but less privileged-voters from the ballot box.
(That puts you in company with the likes of many Southern small town white sheriffs in the 1960's.) I am
glad that you-like George Wallace-finally repented." Daniel C. Barcus, 416 West Briar Place, Chicago,
IL 60657, barcus@attmail.com; "I myself, will not knowingly do business with an establishment which
is know to be prejudice, whether it be for the color of one's skin, the person's gender, the person's sexual
orientation, or for one's age.... I have not, nor would, nor will perpetrate nor perpetuate discrimination
in any shape, way, or form. Neither should you, nor other government employees, especially in the course
of their duties to the U.S. public." LH. Kinder, 11200 SEE C-42, Unit C, Summerfield, FL 3449 1. These
individuals would have considered the SEC proposed rule change to be a victory for shareholders in general
and more specifically, for shareholder proposals that seek to curb discrimination. The e-mail letters hold
the SEC responsible for allowing the exclusion of these anti-discrimination proposals and incorrectly
assume that the proposals will automatically be included if the SEC reverses its Cracker Barrel position.
"09 Mary Gordon, SEC Broadens Shareholder's Voice, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 20, 1998 ("Agency
staff members said they didn't recommend adoption of some of the earlier proposals because of strong
opposition expressed in letters by more than 2,000 individuals and organizations.").
110 Rachel Witmer, Proxies: Jesse Jackson Joins Shareholder's Groups Spurning SEC's
Shareholder Proposal Plan, BNA, Securities Regulations and Law, Vol. 29, at 1518, 1519 (1997).
II Id. at 1518.
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Nell Minow of LENS, Inc., a fund with $100 million, explained that
"[c]orporations try to cut off questions, try to cut off embarrassment," even
though it is in the corporation's financial interest to deal with diversity and
environmental issues.1
12
Particularly controversial was the 3% override provision; the provision
would have allowed 3% of share ownership to override a management
decision and force management to include proposals about ordinary business
matters.I" Elizabeth Elliott McGeveran, managing director of Co-op America,
objected to this 3% override provision."4 McGeveran argued that the override
level should be lowered to 0.25%, rather than 3%, as that would be a
"reasonable indicator of massive shareholder concern."' 5 Securities and
Exchange Commissioner, Steven Wallman, also doubted the effectiveness of
the 3% override. He wrote that "[w]hile theoretically proponents of a social
proposal could be helped by the availability of a shareholder override-a
threshold set at the high level of 3 percent-combined with the practical
difficulties of soliciting or doing a major publicity campaign-will constrain
its practical effectiveness."
'" 6
The rejected package would have also increased the resubmission
thresholds, thus, making it harder to present proposals receiving a small
percentage of the votes cast on an earlier submission." 7 Currently, under rule
14a-8(c)(12), if a proposal fails to receive a specified level of support, then
proposals addressing substantially the same subject matter can be excluded for
a three year period. In order to avoid future exclusion, a proposal must
receive at least 3% of the vote on its first submission, 6% on the second, and
10% on the third. The rejected rule sought to increase the resubmission
threshold to 6% on the first submission, 15% on the second submission, and
30% on the third. The coalition of shareholder activists also criticized this
increased threshold requirement. Tom Flanagan, President of Investors Rights
Association of America, asserted that, "most decent proposals only get 25%
of the votes.""' 8 He concluded that the 30% threshold in the third year "will
knock out almost all proposals.""' 9
112 Id.
113 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 14-17.
14 Witmer, supra note 110, at 1519.
15 Id. at 1519.
116 Bailey and Syre, supra note 107. See also, Michael Schreder, Groups Unite to Oppose SEC's
Efforts to Shift Stance on Shareholder Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at A8.
17 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 13.
151 Witmer, supra note 110, at 1519.
119 Id. at 1519.
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The current rule also permits management to exclude proposals relating
to a personal claim or grievance.2 This management decision can then be
reviewed by the SEC staff to determine whether or not the exclusion applies.
Under the rejected package, the SEC would have expressed "no view" on the
exclusion of a proposal if the proposal, on its face, related to a personal
grievance121 The coalition also criticized this personal grievance provision
and argued that almost anything can be characterized as a personal grievance.
Minow demonstrated the problem by pointing out that she does not resort to
submitting a shareholder proposal until she has had some difficulty dealing
with the managers of the corporation. 22 In other words, any shareholder
proposal, by its very nature, can be characterized by the managers as a per-
sonal grievance."n Because of overwhelming criticism of these provisions, the
SEC rejected the proposed package of reforms and merely reversed its Cracker
Barrel position.'24 Shareholder activists celebrated this reversal as a victory.
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE REVERSAL OF THE CRACKER BARREL
POSITION
At first glance, the reversal of the Cracker Barrel position appears to be
a major achievement for advocates of discrimination related shareholder
proposals. 125 Proposals designed to address employment discrimination are
once again eligible for shareholder review. However, the reversal of the
120 Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 7.
121 Id. at 8.
2 Witmer, supra note 110, at 1519.
123 Currently, Rule 14-8(cX5) also allows shareholder proposals to be excluded if they are not
"relevant." The rule permits managers to exclude a proposal relating to operations that involve less than
5% of the corporation's assets, if not "otherwise significantly related to the corporation's business."
Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 8. The rejected rule would have made this relevancy exception into a
purely economic test that would not have considered whether or not the proposal is "otherwise significantly
related to the corporation's business." Proposed Rule, supra note 52, at 8.
1u Mary Gordon, SEC Broadens Shareholder's Voice, Associated Press, May 20, 1998; Leader
in Socially Responsible Investing Responds to Proposed Shareholder Rules by SEC; Calvert Seeks Greater
Access to Information on Employment Practices for Shareholders, BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 8, 1997 (the
Calvert Group submitted formal comments to the SEC stating that the proposed amendments would be un-
supportive and stifling to shareholder democracy); Bailey and Syre, supra note 107 (former SEC commis-
sioner Steven M.H. Waltman stated, "'While Cracker Barrel may be reversed in form if the proposals are
adopted, it is unclear... whether it will be reversed in substance."); Steve Goldstein, Governance Gurus
Lean Toward Investors in Shareholder Proposal Fight, Institutional Investors, Inc., CORP. FIN. WEEK, Jan.
5, 1998; Dominic Bencivenga, Finding Middle Ground, Two Experts Craft SEC Compromise Proposal,
NEW YORK L.J., Jan 29, 1998; Cornish F. Hitchcock, SEC Moves to Silence Shareholders, NEW JERSEY
L.J., Jan 5, 1998 at 20 (criticizing the package of reforms and pointing out that to use the 3% override
provision at a large corporation such as General Electric, shareholders would need $2 billion in GE stock).
125 Individuals' E-mail, supra note 108.
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Cracker Barrel position exchanges a bright-line rule for the discretion of the
SEC, and returns shareholders, managers, and the courts to the vacillation and
uncertainty that existed before the Cracker Barrel position.
A. History of SEC Vacillation
The reversal of Cracker Barrel's bright-line approach is a return to the
case-by-case analysis"2 that produced contradictory and confusing no-action
letters. This vacillation by the SEC creates inconsistent case law and
frustrates the efforts of both shareholders and managers. Indeed, it was this
very confusion and frustration that lead to the Cracker Barrel bright-line rule
in 1992.27 The history of SEC vacillation about the ordinary business
exception leaves the discrimination related proposal on shaky ground.
Matters once treated as excludable ordinary business are later considered
"significant issues of public policy." Examples include the following: senior
executive compensation;" director compensation;12 9 tobacco manu-facturing
and production; 30 plant closings;" and golden parachutes.'32 At the same
' SEC Proposes Reform of Shareholder Proposal Process, Corporate Secretary's Guide:
Corporate Directions 149, Issue No. 229, Oct. 7, 1987.
127 Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 1. See generally, Waite supra note 70 (arguing
that the ordinary business exception should be eliminated because of the confusion and uncertainty it
causes); Andrew J. Frackman and Achilles M. Perry, ACTWU v. Wal-Mart: Is this the Cost of Corporate
Democracy?, 9 INSIGHTs 2. 3 (Aug. 1995) (stating that the uncertainty reflected in the Cracker Barrel no-
action letter undermines the utility of the shareholder proposal rule and exceptions).
In Compare Reebok Intl. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991-1992 Transfer Binder Fed.Sec.LRep.
(CCH) Para. 76,131, at 79,337 (Mar. 16, 1992) (stating that proposals relating to senior executive
compensation can not be omitted because such proposals "no longer can be considered matters relating to
a registrant's business") with General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 136
(Jan. 31, 1990) (allowing exclusion of proposal regarding incentive compensation since it deals with a
matter of ordinary business, namely employee compensation). See generally, Eric A. Welter The
Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Change to Certainty, 60 GEO. WASH. L REv. 1980, 2004 (1992).
129 Compare Black Hills Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 212 (Feb. 13,
1992) (stating that management must include a proposal relating to retirement plans for outside directors
because proposals relating to "director compensation no longer can be considered matters relating to a
registrant's business") with North Fork Bancorporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act LEXIS
409 (Mar. 5, 1991) (stating that management may exclude a proposal requiring directors to waive their fees
until the stock price reached a specified level because the proposal relates to "ordinary business
operations").
130 Compare Philip Morris Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 335
(Feb. 13, 1990) (stating that management must include a proposal forbidding the company from doing
business in tobacco products after December 31, 1999) with Philip Morris Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 96 (Jan. 18, 1990) (stating that management may exclude a very similar
proposal). See generally, Welter supra note 128 at 2004.
131 Compare Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 104 (Feb. 2,
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time, matters once considered "significant policy issues" are later treated as
excludable "ordinary business." The following are examples: corporate
charitable contributions; 33 the manufacture of tobacco-related products; 3' and
affirmative action and equal employment policies." 5 The SEC's reversals of
its own staff position add to this inconsistency.136 For example, in a no-action
letter to Capital Cities/ABC 37 the SEC staff first issued a no-action letter
1989) (stating that management must include a proposal for study on impact of plant closings and
announcing staff position to allow inclusion of proposals that "deal generally with the broad social and
economic impact of plant closings or relocations") with Centennial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 955 (Sept. 7, 1989) (stating that management may exclude a proposal to reverse
decision to close a particular plant because closing of facilities is a matter of "ordinary business
operations"). See generally, Welter, supra note 128 at 2004.
132 Compare Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989-1990 Transfer Binder
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) Para. 78,338, at 79,260 (Jan. 10, 1990) (stating that management must include a
proposal on golden parachutes and reversing staff position by citing to changes in the tax code and an
increasing "public debate concerning potential anti-takeover, tax and legal implication of golden
parachute[s]") with Centennial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act LEXIS 955 (Sept.
7, 1989) (stating that management may exclude a proposal to limit golden parachute payments to two
executives because proposal relates to "ordinary business operations"). See generally, Welter, supra note
128 at 2004.
133 Compare Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter. 1992 SEC No-Act LEXIS 209 (Feb. 19, 1992)
(stating that management may exclude a proposal that company refrain from giving money to pro-abortion
groups) with American Telephone and Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act LEXIS
76 (Jan. 16, 1991) (stating that management must include proposals that company contribute to teenage
pregnancy prevention programs on the ground that management decisions on charitable expenditures
involve issues "beyond matters of the Company's ordinary business operations").
13 Compare Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act LEXIS 344 (Feb. 28, 1991)
(stating that management may exclude a proposal to stop manufacture of plastic film used in cigarette
packaging) with Kimberley-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act LEXIS 330 (Feb. 22,
1990) (stating that management must include a proposal to cease production of cigarette paper by Dec. 31,
1999, because of "growing significance of the social and public policy issues attendant to the operations
of involving the manufacture of tobacco related products").
135 Compare Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act LEXIS
984 (Oct. 13, 1992) (stating that management may exclude a proposal that company implement no-
discriminatory employment policies related to sexual orientation because day-to-day issues concerning
hiring and other personnel matters are properly left to the company management) with Dayton Hudson
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act LEXIS 428 (Mar. 8, 1991) (stating that management must
include a proposal for report on the progress of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action
because such questions "involve policy decisions beyond those personnel matters that constitute the
company's ordinary business").
13 Palmiter, supra note 7 1, at 908.
137 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 887 (citing Capital Cites/ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-
Act LEXIS 525, at *1 (Apr. 4, 1991); Def. Ex. P at I [Letter from Secretary of SEC to General Counsel of
Capital Cities/ABC] Apr. 4 1991). See also, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No-Act
LEXIS 572 (Apr. 10, 1991) (reversing staff position and allowing exclusion of a proposal to establish a
program to provide affirmative action information to shareholders); Texaco Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
SEC No-Act LEXIS 498 (Mar. 31, 1992) (reversing staff position and allowing exclusion of proposal
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requiring inclusion of a shareholder proposal calling for annual reports on the
company's affirmative action programs. Upon the request of the management,
the SEC reviewed its no-action letter, reversed its own staff's position, and
stated that the proposal was excludable under the ordinary business
exception. 38 The SEC's recent reversal of the Cracker Barrel position fails
to clarify which shareholder proposals should be excludable under the
ordinary business exception. Instead, it merely returns discretion to the
SEC, 139 allowing more inconsistent and contradictory no-action letters."4
Although the SEC's Cracker Barrel position failed to establish a fair and
reasonable rule about which sorts of proposals should have been excluded, the
position was successful in that it created a clear rule that shareholders and
managers relied on when making decisions about shareholder proposals.
t4'
However, the recent reversal of the Cracker Barrel position does not provide
any guarantees that employment discrimination related proposals will be
included because the SEC still has the authority to declare all discrimination
related proposal excludable under the ordinary business exception. 14 2 The
varying viewpoints of the SEC leadership and their historical tendency to
requesting the company to reject any taxpayer-guaranteed loans in its overseas operations).
13 Id.
139 Proposed Rule, supra note 52.
140 Because the SEC must, once again, determine which discrimination related proposals fall into
the ordinary business exception, it is important to point out the ways in which discrimination policies are
not ordinary business. A policy to discriminate based on sexual orientation is very different from issues
of management in the work place, employee supervision, and hiring and firing, in part, because it is so
controversial. It is the controversy raised by explicit discrimination that makes it far from ordinary. Thus,
a proposal involving controversial discrimination policies should not fall under the ordinary business
exception. See generally, Steven M. H. Wallman, Equality Is More Than 'Ordinary Business, N.Y. TIms,
Mar. 30, 1997, at section 3, page 12. If the SEC returns to a position of discretion, it should distinguish
controversial employment discrimination proposals from more ordinary and mundane employment
proposals. Id.
141 See generally, Connell supra note 4 (arguing that the Cracker Barrel position was a "line drawn
wrong").
142 "Although social policy proposals related to employment will no longer be automatically
excludable, neither will they be automatically included. The return to subjective line-drawing by the staff,
coupled with the shift to purely economic test under the relevance exclusion, leaves open the possibility of
continued attempts to exclude many social proposals (whether related to employment or not)." Proposed
Rule Supplement: Concurrence of Commissioner Steven M.H. Wallman (S7-25-97)
(www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ s72597cn.htm) [hereinafter Concurrence of Commissioner Wallman]; SEC
Proposes Reform of Shareholder Proposal Process, Corporate Secretary's Guide: Corporate Directions,
Issue No. 229, October 7, 1887, at 149; Connell, supra note 4, at 426 ("Moreover, we would just be waiting
for the day when there is the next Cracker Barrel--the next position taken that excludes matters that many
believe should be included.").
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vacillate about which proposals fall under the ordinary business exception
should provide no comfort for advocates of the shareholder proposal. 43
The return to SEC discretion creates uncertainty and promotes ineffi-
ciency for shareholders, managers, and the courts.'" More specifically, the
return to fluctuating and contradictory no-action letters will encourage
lawsuits against the SEC because displeased shareholders and managers will
want the SEC's inconsistent no-action letters reviewed by the courts.
However, when a court reviews a no-action letter it will be faced with
confusion about the level of deference owed to the SEC. Deference to the
SEC is based, in part, on the consistency or lack of consistency of the SEC's
no-action letters. t4" On the one hand, some fluctuation in SEC policies should
be acceptable in order to accommodate for changing conditions and circum-
stances. 46 Yet, at the same time, the SEC's no-action letters deserve less
deference when the SEC's reasoning and findings are varied and
inconsistent.147 Without the SEC's no-action letters as a guidepost, different
courts will come to different conclusions about which employment related
proposals are excludable. Once again, this inconsistency will lead to
confusion and inefficiency for all parties involved. Furthermore, confusion
and inefficiency will do little to create a forum for discussion and dialogue
about unaddressed discrimination." In order for the SEC no-action letters to
"4 See, Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulations, 46 VAND. L
REV. 1129, 1130 (1993) (arguing that the SEC's vacillation stems from a uncertainty about its rulemaking
authority in regards to the solicitation of proxies and that the history of the SEC's rulemaking has reflected
political compromise between the pressures of various interest groups); Concurrence of Commissioner
Wallman, supra note 142, at 2. See generally, Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. at 886 (demonstrating the history
of SEC vacillation).
I" See generally, Waite supra note 70 (arguing that the ordinary business exception should be
eliminated because of the confusion and uncertainty it causes); Andrew J. Frackman and Achilles M. Perry,
A CTWU v. Wal-Mart: Is this the Cost of Corporate Democracy?, 9 No.8 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (August 1995)
(stating that the uncertainty reflected in the Cracker Barrel no-action letter undermines the utility of the
shareholder proposal rule and exceptions).
14" Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. 877.
146 I. at 885 ("In determining whether to defer to a position drawn from a series of no-action letters,
courts must recognize that a change in SEC position does not necessarily reveal capricious action by the
agency; changes in conditions and public perceptions justify changes in the SEC's construction of the
'ordinary business operation' exception.").
147 Id. at 885 (refusing to defer to the SEC, in part, because an agency interpretation that conflicts
with the agency's earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held
agency view) (citations omitted).
14 Dominic Bencivenga, Finding Middle Ground: Two Experts Craft SEC Compromise Proposals,
NEw YoRK L.J., Jan 29, 1998. "It's very ironic for a government agency to want to get out of regulating
something, and for all the parties to say 'No. you're doing a great job, stay,"' said Brian J. Lane, the SEC
director of the corporation finance division. ld This comment does not recognize that before Cracker
Barrel the SEC was not doing a 'great job,' but instead produced vacillating and confusing no-action letters.
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be useful to participants, the SEC must provide consistency in its decisions. 4 9
A presumption in favor of inclusion, rather than a codification of SEC
discretion, would promote this consistency.s
B. Unaddressed Discrimination and the Corporate Forum
1. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Although many would agree that discrimination issues deserve to be
debated, the determination of an appropriate forum for this debate is very
controversial. Business leaders often insist that discrimination issues should
be addressed in a setting other than the corporate forum.'' Some argue that
the corporation is an improper forum because the purpose of a corporation is
profit maximization.'52
However, a presumption in favor of shareholder proposals that confront
discrimination would not conflict with the profit maximizing goals of
corporations. Proponents demonstrate that confronting discrimination through
socially responsible investing can actually increase the profit margin in certain
political situations.' For example, unresolved discrimination disputes lead
to negative media coverage and expensive law suits that deplete corporate
profits."M By averting such complications, profit maximization can be attained
149 See Welter, supra note 128, at 2013-14.
'50 A presumption in favor of inclusion would not deprive the SEC of all discretion. SEC discretion
can allow for consideration of unique facts and, thus, may lead to morm sophisticated results. Thus, a
presumption should allow SEC discretion to exclude proposals in extreme situations.
151 Witmer, supra note 110, at 1518 (paraphrasing Steve Viederman who asserts that the Business
Round Table has suggested that social workplace issues should be dealt with in other forums).
1 Id. at 1518.
'53 Maria O'Brien Hylton, Socially Responsible Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an
Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L REV. 1 (1992) (arguing: i) socially responsible investing is a form of
consumption; ii) ethical investing is a way of avoiding high risk investments; and iii) income can be
maximized by ethical investing because in certain political situations companies with socially responsible
business practices will outperform other companies).
154 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F.Supp. 1190, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Robert Whitman, Including Employment Practice Data In Proxy Statements, NEW YORK L., Nov. 6,
1997, Section: Outside Counsel at 1 (proponents of resolutions that would force companies to reveal
employment information argue that shareholders have a right to such information because employment
litigation has a real effect on the bottom line). Recent examples of employment litigation include the
following: in the face of publicity and a consumer boycott Texaco settled for $172 million; Mitsubishi was
hit with negative publicity surrounding charges of sexual harassment and a suit brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; Home Depot reportedly agreed to pay more than $85 million to
settle sex discrimination in west coast stores; and Shoney's settled a race discrimination class action in
1992 for $103 million and saw earnings drop. Id
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through political and social shareholder proposals.' Resolution of discrimi-
nation issues contributes to, rather than conflicts with, profitability.
Arguments that socially responsible investing can increase the profit
margin are often helpful to the shareholder activist. At the same time, the
arguments avoid important questions about the current conception of
corporate purpose.5 6 Many commentators assert that the regulation of
corporations first became dominant in the latter half of the 20th century.
5 7
They insist that it was not until the 1960's that corporations became political
actors in order to face consumer, environmental, and civil rights laws that
were passed to constrain the freedom of corporate management.58 Other
commentators argue that it was only in the 1990's that corporate managers
began to feel pressure to take on "social responsibilities," based on a growing
sense that business had a positive duty to advance moral and economic
aims.'
59
In fact, an expanded conception of corporate purpose, one that melds
profit maximization goals with other social aims, is as old as the corporation
itself. For example, the British East India Company, chartered in 1600, was
the first important joint-stock enterprise in an English speaking country."W It
was not only a profit-making organization, but it was also an instrument of the
British Crown, endowed with monopoly status in its business and quasi-
governmental power to pursue its assigned mission. 161 Similarly, the founders
of the United States (Jefferson, Madison, Jackson) embraced private
135 Id. See also, Palmiter, supra note 71, at 923 (arguing that there is nothing wrong with a
corporation opting for different models of profit-maximization such as combining environmental
responsibility and profits).
' See generally, Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L REV. 899 (1993) (relational feminism
that emphasizes connection and community rather than the narrow pursuit of self-interest can contribute
to this debate about corporate purpose); Palmitei, supra note 71, at 923 (arguing that there is nothing wrong
with a corporation opting for different models of profit-maximization such as combining environmental
responsibility and profits).
157 James Q. Wilson, The Corporation as a Political Actor, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION
TODAY 418 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996) (presuming that the regulation of the corporate process is new and
criticizing the strong state model).
15 Id. at 414-15.
,s9 George David Smith and Davis Dyer, The Rise and Transformation of the American
Corporation, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 28, 29, 57 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996) (arguing that
the claims of owners have a particularly heavy influence in the United States).
160 Thomas K. McCraw, The Evolution of the Corporation in the United States, in THE U.S.
BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN INSITITrON IN TRANSmON 3 (John R. Meyer and James M. Gustafson eds.,
1988).
161 Id. at 3. This wider conception of corporate purpose also applied to he Massachusetts Bay
Company, the London Virginia Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the Royal African Company.
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ownership where the corporation's conduct would be subject to public review
and control through extensive disclosure of corporate information, supervision
by government regulators, and potential legislative intervention. 62 The
corporation was "private property infused with public purpose, sanctified by
public approval, disciplined by public authority, answerable to public
scrutiny."163
In the late 18th and early 19th centuries U.S. business corporations were
created to perform public functions such as providing education and urban
services, as well as, building the country's infrastructure.164 Governments gave
these corporations privileges such as monopoly rights, eminent domain, and
exemption from liability because of the public need for their services.'( In the
early years of the American industrial revolution, many new corporations
formed, seemingly because of the desire of the government to use the
corporate device for a public purpose.'" A corporation operated for the public
good because "the community, not the capitalists, marked out its sphere of
activity."1 67 It was not until the second industrial revolution (1850 to 1950)
that the corporation changed from a construct with public functions into an
autonomous organization that was separate from government.'(, However, the
relationship between corporations and the government remains contested
ground.
In Wal-Mart, 69 the court implicitly raised questions of corporate purpose
and profit maximization. By forcing Wal-Mart to consider employment
162 Paul H. Weaver, After Social Responsibility, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN
INSTITUTION IN TRANSITION 134, 138 (John R. Meyer and James M. Gustafson eds., 1988).
163 Id. at 138. George Perkins said, "The larger the corporation becomes, the greater its
responsibilities to the entire community." Il at 138 (citing George W. Perkins, The Modern Corporation,
pamphlet of an address given at the Columbia University. New York, N.Y. February 7, 1908 at 16). These
arguments were sometimes veiled attempts to obtain government subsidies. Id. at 139. For example, the
Illinois Central argued that their North/South railroad would help save the union and get the railroad federal
subsidies. Similarly, AT&T argued for the state governments to give AT&T the status of a regulated
monopoly because people deserved cheaper, high quality phone service. Id. (citing Carter Goodrich,
Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads, 1800-1890, at 171 (1960) and John Brooks,
Telephone: The First Hundred Years, at 142-45 (1976)). These examples merely demonstrate that today's
assumption that wealth maximization is the only legitimate purpose of a corporation was, historically, a
question for debate.
'64 WLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
IN AMERICA 16 (1997).
165 Id. at 16.
16 McCraw, supra note 160, at 4.
167 Id. at 4 (citing Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business
Corporation, Journal of Economic History 5, 22-23 (May 1945)).
I" Id. at7.
169 Wal-Mart, 821 F.Supp. 877.
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discrimination issues, the shareholder proposal questioned the assumption that
the corporation's solitary purpose was profit maximization. By ruling that
affirmative action policies were not excludable under the ordinary business
exception, the Wal-Mart court expanded conceptions of corporate purpose and
acknowledged the need for corporations to address discrimination. In effect,
the Wal-Mart decision requires corporations to include issues of employment
discrimination in their conception of corporate purpose.
In contrast to this expanded notion of corporate purpose, other courts
maintain a narrower conception. For example, in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC,"° the plaintiff sought to force a corporation to disclose
information about its environmental impact and employment policies. The
court required further SEC rule-making and argued that employment
information was unique because it was more likely than environmental
information to affect the profits of the corporation.' 7 ' Instead of arguing that
the employment discrimination was especially unjust or harmful to employees,
the court focused on the fact that employment discrimination could result in
future liability for the corporation." z Thus, in contrast to the Wal-Mart court,
this court justified its holding by using a more narrow profit maximization
model.
These examples demonstrate the controversy surrounding corporate
purpose and profit maximization principles. Goals of profit maximization
have always had to operate in the midst of constraints; the constraints created
by the Wal-Mart holding are consistent with the types of constraints placed on
corporations since their inception. For example, government already limits
the ability of corporations to maximize profits by creating wage and safety
regulations. Although these regulations may diminish corporate profits, our
current cultural and political values require such standards for the public good.
Similarly, the impact of unaddressed discrimination justifies the inclusion of
discrimination related proposals. Furthermore, our current conception of
corporate purpose need not be conceived so narrowly as to exclude discrimi-
nation related proposals.
170 432 F.Supp. 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
171 Id. at 1210.
172 Id. at 1210 ("Even a cursory examination of the 'over 100' matters deemed equivalent to equal
employment opportunity reveals that most, perhaps even all, of these other matters of social concern are
substantially less likely than equal employment opportunity to result in significant future financial liabilities
to registrants.").
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2. No OTHER FORUM
Unaddressed discrimination, by definition, does not have an alternative
forum. An individual can not bring a claim of discrimination unless a statute,
law, or constitutional amendment has addressed that form of discrimination.
However, our cultural and political values rest on the assumption that many
types of discrimination are unjust and, thus, deserve to be addressed in some
sort of forum. If one forum is unavailable, then an alternative forum must be
found. If one starts with the assumption that discrimination against lesbians
and gay men, for example, is unjust, then it follows that such discrimination
is deserving of a forum. It is precisely because this discrimination is
unaddressed in the more conventional forums, that our cultural and political
values require the inclusion of these proposals in the alternative forum.173
In NYCERS v. American Brands, Inc., 4 the court stated that "[t]he
shareholder proposal rule is perhaps the only means by which a shareholder
has any realistic chance of being taken seriously by the management of a
large, publicly-held corporation, or of exercising, along with his fellow
shareholders, any meaningful corporate suffrage."' 5 This statement empha-
sizes shareholder participation in a case where the proposal specifically
addressed discrimination. Similarly, in Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,76
the district court emphasized shareholder participation when it granted an
173 The concern for an appropriate foum raises questions of corporate governance. There is much
academic debate about the benefits and risks of shareholder activism and shareholder passivity. See
generally, John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 837 (1994) (arguing that deregulation will not necessarily lead to shareholder activism and that the
fear of shareholder activism is not based in reality); William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery,
Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L REV. 1861
(1995) (argument for corporate self-regulation through institutional shareholder participation); Jayne W.
Barnard, Shareholder Access To The Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L REV. 37 (1990) (arguing for
shareholder voting). Compare, Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate
Finance, 85 CAL L REV. 1 (1997) (critiquing shareholder activism and arguing that shareholder passivity
is a direct product of the risk managing role of institutional investors); Roberta Romano, Public Pension
Fund Activism In Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993) (arguing that
public pension funds have geographic-based conflicts of interest that will limit shareholder activism); Park
McGinty, The Twilight Of Fiduciary Duties: On The Need For Shareholder Self-Help In An Age Of
Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L J. 163 (1997) (arguing that the interests of proponents of
shareholder proposals diverge from the interests of shareholders).
174 634 F.Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
1" Id. at 1387. The court held that American Brands must include the proposed adoption of the
MacBride Principles in its proxy material. The MacBride Principles sought to curb employment
discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. The shareholder proposal was meant to
apply to American Brand's subsidiary in Northern Ireland. Id. at 1384.
176 618 F.Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985).
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injunction requiring the inclusion of a shareholder proposal related to the
treatment of animals. The court reasoned that the shareholder would be
irreparably harmed if he lost the "opportunity to communicate his concern
with those shareholders not attending the upcoming shareholder meeting."
Furthermore, the district court found that "public interest" was served by
allowing all shareholders to make an informed vote on the proposal.
17
Shareholder participation should also be emphasized when the subject matter
of the proposal has no other forum. Steve Viederman, President of the Jessie
Smith Noyes Foundation which has $73 billion in assets, responded to the
argument that environmental and social workplace issues should be dealt with
in other forums by stating the following: "There are no other forums .... The
shareholder process is the forum."'
't7
In part, there is no alternative forum for issues of discrimination based on
sexual orientation because the courts have concluded that lesbians and gay
men do not need special protection. One of the roles of the courts is to protect
the interests of minorities that do not have access to the legislative process. 7 9
However, courts have found that equal protection claims by lesbians and gay
men do not warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. 80 Many courts have argued
against heightened scrutiny for lesbians and gay men, in contrast to racial
minorities, by stating that lesbians and gay men do not lack political power'
17 Id. at 562.
179 Witmer, supra note 110. at 1518.
179 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally, JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, (1980) (arguing that courts
should facilitate the representation of minorities and eliminate malfunctions in the democratic process);
Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L REV. 641 (1991) (arguing Ely's book is
not convincing).
ISO Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (finding that Amendment II violates the Fourteenth
Amendment even under rational basis review); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Hardwick compels the conclusion that classifications based
on sexual orientation deserve no more than rational basis review); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,
466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) cert. denied 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S.Ct. 1296 (1990) (ruling that Hardwick foreclosed
heightened judicial scrutiny for discrimination based on sexual orientation, and that the military's policy
was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (denying the equal protection challenge and stating that it would be anomalous to declare that
a status defined by conduct which may be criminalized (sodomy), is deserving of strict scrutiny);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) cert. denied 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 1295
(ruling that homosexuality's non-immutability blocked any claims to suspect classification status); Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The Supreme
Court has also held that the constitutional right to privacy does not protect homosexual conduct. Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
M' See, High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 ("... legislatures have addressed and continue to address
the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through passage of
antidiscrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not without political power .... ); Ben-Shalom v.
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sufficient to constitute a "discrete and insular minority.' ' 82 In other words,
courts decline to create protections because they conclude that lesbians and
gay men have the political and economic power needed to protect themselves.
The Supreme Court, in the landmark case Romer v. Evans, 3 found that
Colorado's constitutional amendment prohibiting protection of lesbians and
gay men was unconstitutional as a per se equal protection violation and lacked
a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.' Colorado's
Amendment II prohibited all legislative, executive, and judicial action that
was designed to protect lesbians or gay men."8 5 By ruling against Amendment
1I, the Court allowed lesbians and gay men to use the political and economic
power that other courts have relied on when denying heightened scrutiny. If
it is correct that lesbians and gay men have influence and power (and, thus, do
not constitute a discrete and insular minority) then courts, in order to be
consistent, must allow lesbians and gay men to exercise their political and
financial power to change the policies of corporations. More generally, when
courts and legislatures decline to protect a minority group because of the
group's power, it follows that the minority group should be permitted to
exercise this power in the private realm. Just as the Romer Court fostered
political debate and voting by ruling against Amendment HI, the SEC should
promote debate and voting by creating a presumption in favor of inclusion of
discrimination proposals.
C. External or Internal Control: The Role of the Government
The SEC can avoid external regulation of business (new anti-discrimina-
tion laws) and instead foster debate in the private sphere with a relatively
neutral type of regulation-shareholder proposal rules. 6 Values arising from
within an organization are likely to be more effective than external regula-
tions. 7 For example, the communicative value of shareholder votes favoring
Marsh, 881 F.2d at 466 n.9 ("Homosexuals are not without political power"); Dahl v. Secretary of U.S.
Navy, 830 F.Supp. 1319, 1324 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ("the recent Congressional and executive dialogue
concerning homosexuals' ability to serve in the military demonstrates that ... homosexuals have a
significant ability to attract Congress' attention.").
192 Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
957 (1990). See generally, WUIJAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 666 (1997).
3 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
194 Romer, supra note 180, at 1620.
19 Id.
196 Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy,
23 GA. L REV. 97, 102 (1988) (arguing that the shareholder proposal rule is a "relatively neutral"
regulatory device).
197 Palmiter, supra note 71, at 899.
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adoption of the Valdez Principles'88 would be superior to a mandate by the
Environmental Protection Agency.'89 However, the reversal of the Cracker
Barrel position does not ensure this internal dialogue and voting. Instead, it
guarantees debate only within the SEC by forcing the SEC staff to decide
which proposals should be included in the proxy material. Rather than
returning to SEC discretion, the shareholder rules should promote a forum for
internal debate by creating a presumption in favor of inclusion. Because of
the benefits of internal decision-making, the SEC's rules should explicitly
include a commitment to shareholder dialogue about undecided discrimination
issues.
Some critics may insist that it is not the role of the government to regulate
shareholder proposals. For example, contractarians argue that because a
corporation is a "nexus of contracts," the government should avoid external
regulation and instead allow for internal bargaining between the contracting
parties (owners, management, and labor) in a corporation." ° In contrast,
progressive scholars argue that the corporation's constituencies cannot
realistically bargain and that external intervention is required to protect the
worker's voice.'9 ' The reversal of the Cracker Barrel position, by returning
discretion to the SEC, effectively sides with the progressives and increases
external regulation.
Instead, the SEC should create a presumption in favor of inclusion and,
thus, promote shareholder debate about these undecided discrimination issues.
By creating a presumption in favor of internal debate and voting the SEC takes
a middle position between the contractarians and the progressive scholars.
Although this presumption is a form of external governmental regulation, it
merely requires dialogue and voting between contracting parties. A require-
ment to debate and vote is much less intrusive than an external regulation that
either gives discretion to a government agency or creates external discrimina-
tion laws that apply to all corporations. A presumption in favor of dialogue
and voting would address the progressives' concern that parties cannot
realistically bargain and, at the same time, would respond to the
lu Geltman, supra note 47. The Valdez Principles require corporations to adopt a comprehensive
code of environmental ethics.
19 Palmiter, supra note 71, at 899.
190 Id. at 862. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L REV. 856, 862 (1997) (reviewing
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)). See also, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTCE, reprinted in JOHN ARTHUR AND WIIJAM H. SHAw, JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 13
(1991). John Rawls articulates a liberal conception of justice that requires basic protection by the state but
leaves other ethical issues up to the individual.
19" O'Connor, supra note 156; Bainbridge, supra note 190.
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contractarians' insistence that government limit external control and allow
parties to bargain with each other.
When the court in NYCERS v. SEC"9 focused on the authority of the SEC
to make and alter rules regarding shareholder proposals, it raised questions
about internal and external control. 93 By ruling in favor of the SEC, the
appellate court gave the SEC authority to further regulate corporations. The
SEC used this authority to impose an external rule allowing employment
related shareholder proposals to be automatically excluded. This choice to
limit shareholder power is an external ruling on how a corporation should be
governed. The SEC's reversal of the Cracker Barrel position also promotes
external control by granting discretion to an external government agency.
However, a presumption that promotes internal voting and dialogue would
provide a better balance between the benefits and drawbacks of both external
regulation and internal decision-making.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than codifying SEC discretion, Rule 14a should establish a
presumption in favor of the shareholder's ability to raise issues of unaddressed
discrimination. For example, the rule could simply state that a proposal
addressing discrimination policies does not normally fall under the ordinary
business exception. At a minimum, the rule should include a discrimination
related proposal in its list of examples in order to demonstrate that proposals
confronting unaddressed discrimination are generally includable in the
management's proxy material. This presumption would not overrule the
ordinary business exception and, thus, proposals about day-to-day employ-
ment matters would still be excludable. Furthermore, the presumption could
be overcome where the proposal is frivolous, based on a personal grievance,
or falls under another exclusionary provision.
The shareholder proposal process is an appropriate forum to raise these
discrimination issues, in part, because discrimination related proposals do not
conflict with profit maximization principles. Furthermore, the lack of an
192 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
193 NYCERS v. SEC, 843 F.Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (reversed and vacated in part, and
dismissed in par in NYCERS v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995)). The lower court found that the SEC had
changed a legislative rule without prior notice and comment. In responding to Cracker Barrel's no-action
request, the SEC found that the proposal raised substantial policy considerations, but was nonetheless
excludable. The lower court argued that this finding constituted a change in a legislative rule without prior
notice or comment. Thus, the lower court enjoined the SEC from issuing letters that indicated a change in
the SEC position without officially changing the legislative rule and abiding by the proper procedure. In
contrast, the appellate court found that the SEC altered an interpretive rule and, thus, there were no notice
and comment requirements.
1999] SEC'S REVERSAL OF CRACKER BARREL 307
alternative forum supports a presumption that these types of proposals should
not be omitted under the ordinary business exception. Because courts reason
that lesbians and gay men have adequate influence and, thus, do not need
special protections, consistency requires that this minority group be allowed
to exercise this influence in the corporate forum. Finally, a presumption in
favor of internal debate and voting would require internal decision-making
without imposing new discrimination laws from external sources.
The reversal of the SEC's Cracker Barrel position is a limited victory
because it returns the shareholder proposal to the discretion and vacillation of
the SEC staff. Shareholders and managers need a stable position to bring
about efficiency; activists need a clear position to bring about debate and
dialogue. A presumption in favor of inclusion would be a first step toward
this more certain position.

